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Kathleen Daly and Michael Tonry

Gender, Race, and
Sentencing

ABSTRACT

Race and gender pose empirical and policy problems that are both similar
and different for the U.S. criminal justice system. They are similar in that
blacks and women occupy subordinate social and economic positions in
American life, and their interests are less likely to be represented in the
justice system than are those of white men. They are different in that
blacks are overrepresented in arrest statistics and jail and prison
populations while women are underrepresented. If over- (or under-)
representation is assumed to result from similar effects of bias and
subordination, the two patterns are hard to explain. The empirical
literature on criminal courts reveals policy dilemmas in achieving "just"
sentencing practices. Blacks (and especially black men) may be more likely
than white men or women to benefit from tightly limited discretion and
limited individualization of sentencing whereas women (both black and
white) may be more likely to benefit from broader discretion and greater
individualization. Future policies will need to confront the competing
demands of justice that race and gender pose in the official response to
crime.
On June 30, 1995, federal and state prisons in the United States held
1,104,074 sentenced prisoners. Black men and women, who are 12 percent of the general population, were 51 percent of prisoners. Women
of all racial and ethnic groups, who are 51 percent of the general population, were 6 percent (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995b).
Racial and ethnic disproportionalities in those charged, convicted,
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and sentenced for crime in the United States have received renewed
attention in recent years. Reports by The Sentencing Project, which
showed that in 1990 and 1995, respectively, 23 and 32 percent of black
men aged twenty to twenty-nine were in jail or prison or on probation
or parole, received front-page attention in newspapers and electronic
media. So did estimates from the National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives, which showed that in 1991 in Baltimore and Washington,
D.C., respectively, 56 and 42 percent of black men aged eighteen to
thirty-five were under some form of criminal justice system control
(Tonry and Hamilton 1997).
Gender disproportionalities, while receiving relatively less media or
political attention, are as great as or greater than those for race. For
example, in 1995 the male incarceration rate for state and federal prisons, 789 per 100,000, was sixteen times the female rate of 47 per
100,000. In 1993, the black incarceration rate, 1,471 per 100,000, was
seven times the white rate of 207 per 100,000 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995a, 1995b).
At every stage of the justice system for which national data are available, the 51 percent of Americans who are female make up 6-14 percent of those prosecuted or confined in adult institutions. By contrast,
the 12 percent of Americans who are black make up 40-54 percent of
court and confinement populations. For example, the female share of
convictions in state felony courts in 1990 was 14 percent; the black
share, 47 percent (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1993a, p. 16).' The female share of jail inmates in 1994 was 10 percent; the black share, 44
percent (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995c). The female share of new
court commitments to prisons in 1991 was 9 percent; the black share,
54 percent (Maguire and Pastore 1994, p. 625). Just over 1 percent of
those on death row in 1993 were female; 41 percent were black (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994d, table 6).2
These data suggest distinctive influences of gender and race on patterns of lawbreaking and on the state's response to crime, yet racism
and sexism are often decried in the same sentence as variants of the
same problem: white men's social, economic, and political dominance
over less powerful women and minority group men. This has led some
to adopt the simple working hypothesis of racial and gender discrimi-

IThe black/white composition of felony court defendants varies by the source of data
used (discussed below).
2 An additional 8 percent were Hispanic.
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nation: institutions of criminal justice operate in ways that favor the
interests of whites over blacks (or other minority groups) and of men
over women.
The cross-sectional data portray a more complicated pattern. Race
operates as the hypothesis predicts: blacks are overrepresented in arrest, court, and prison populations. But women, members of the socially subordinate gender group, are underrepresented in arrest, court,
and prison populations. Although the hypothesis holds within gender
groups-that is, among both male and female prisoners, 65 percent are
members of racial or ethnic minority groups (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995a, p. 9)-it cannot explain the disproportionate presence of
men under formal criminal justice control.
The demography of crime and punishment poses challenges to feminist and nonfeminist explanations of crime and punishment. Feminist
theorists have yet to explain why, if men have more power than
women, men are at greater risk to be under criminal justice control.
Nonfeminist theorists have yet to explain why, if disadvantaged members of society are most likely to be under criminal justice control, far
fewer disadvantaged women than disadvantaged men are affected. 3
This essay reviews race and gender patterns in adult arrest and imprisonment statistics, but our focus is on the criminal courts and the
transformation of sentencing policy in the 1970s. We are interested in
understanding why sentencing reform unfolded as it did and with what
consequences for contemporary justice system practices, including dramatic increases in imprisonment for members of all race and gender
groups. We are also interested in the varied ways that race and gender
work in the criminal process and in criminological discourse.
Sentencing and its reform can be seen as one component of a criminal justice system that operates as a "social ordering practice" (Garland
1990; Lacey 1994, pp. 28-35). Sentencing, and punishment more generally, contain symbolic and instrumental elements. The justice system
produces a good deal of injustice, but some of its elements are positive,
indeed indispensable. Moreover, the rhetoric of sentencing reform
must be set alongside the practices: the two do not necessarily coincide. For example, the rhetorical focus of sentencing reform in the
1970s was on "just deserts," but utilitarian considerations could not be
IThis claim is contextual (i.e., within a neighborhood or city) and historically and
culturally specific. It would be wrong to assume that women are (or will be) more lawabiding than men (or less likely to be criminalized) across time, place, nation, and culture.
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avoided or eliminated. The story of sentencing reform was (and is)
partly about "doing justice" better and partly about relegitimating the
state's power to punish in a society rife with "background conditions
of inequality and injustice" (Lacey 1994, p. 33).
Beginning in the early 1970s and with the stated aim of reducing
race and class disparities in the justice system, sentencing reformers
advocated strong equality policies, often expressed in terms of "just deserts" or proportionality theories that emphasized the current offense
and the defendant's criminal history as the primary criteria for sentencing. The central rationale was that the broad discretionary power
permitted in indeterminate sentencing systems was exercised in ways
unfavorable to poor and minority defendants; in particular, by allowing
officials to take into account a defendant's biographical information
(e.g., education, employment prospects, and familial circumstances), it
was believed that white and middle-class defendants were advantaged
over others.
Throughout the debates on sentencing reform, the presumptive sentencing subject was male: women and gender differences were not featured. What might explain this silence? First, like their academic counterparts, criminal justice policy makers would argue that "there were
too few women" to warrant inquiry on the gendered dynamics of
crime and crime control. This seems curious in that men are no less
gendered than women. However, because women are the marked gender category, when the question of "gender" enters criminological discourse, attention centers on "women's issues" or "the female offender." As the unmarked gender category, men are "the norm," the
universal nongendered offender. Second, in feminist criminological
and legal inquiry, and in feminist activism during the 1970s and 1980s,
attention was paid primarily to violence against women. By contrast,
research on women's lawbreaking and its response were (and remain)
less developed. Third, even for those with research and policy interests
in gender, courts, and prisons, it was difficult to know how to engage
4
in policy debates; it was not clear what to recommend.
The early sentencing reform movement in the United States
emerged from a race-centered civil rights movement and from the
prisoners' rights movement that began in the 1960s (e.g., American
'Examples of dilemmas and ambivalences surrounding feminist engagement with
criminal justice are given by Chesney-Lind (1991), on whether to push for building a
women's prison or not, and by Daly (1992) and Howe (1990) on how to represent
women lawbreakers and prisoners.
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Friends Service Committee 1971; Messinger and Johnson 1978). During 1965 to 1975, 96-97 percent of prisoners were men, and approximately 40 percent were black. Sentencing became the object of reformers' attention not only because of widespread interest in
sentencing processes per se but because of concern for racial injustices
in sentencing. Thus, sentencing reform, which developed from the
civil rights movement and was motivated by concerns for fairness to
prisoners, was primarily focused on eliminating racial bias and primarily committed to values of equal treatment. Without giving it much
attention, sentencing reformers assumed that the logics of racial and
gender injustice were similar, requiring similar methods of redress.
In every jurisdiction that changed its sentencing policies and attempted to establish sentencing guidelines, three propositions were
taken as self-evident. First, race and gender were believed to be illegitimate considerations in sentencing. Second, other factors like education
and employment were considered to be forbidden or discouraged because they would work systematically and directly to the detriment of
poor defendants and, because proportionately more blacks than whites
were poor, indirectly to the detriment of black defendants. Third, because most judges then (as now) were white men, it was assumed that,
if given broad discretion, they would be influenced by conscious or unconscious prejudice toward members of minority groups. Thus, it was
decided that sentencing should be based on the nature and seriousness
of the crime and that judicial discretion should be tightly constrained.
Gender was largely absent from the debates and calculations: if race
was a forbidden consideration, so self-evidently was gender. Equal
treatment was (and is) a seductive criminal justice ideology; there appeared to be no legal or policy alternative. An immediate difficulty
arose, however, from reviews of the statistical research literature
(Blumstein et al. 1983; Nagel and Hagan 1983). After controlling for
the defendant's prior record of arrests or convictions, and the type and
severity of the convicted charge, women's sentences appeared to be less
severe than men's. If future sentences were to be based on past average
sentences for men or on an average of men's and women's sentences
(no jurisdiction considered using average sentences for women), the
policy choice was between "equal treatment" (i.e., using past averages
and applying them both to men and women) or "special treatment"
(i.e., preserving a two-track system in which it appeared that women
were sentenced less severely).
Every jurisdiction we are aware of, including Minnesota, Pennsylva-
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nia, Washington, Oregon, Kansas, North Carolina, and the federal
sentencing commission, opted for equal treatment. They used the seriousness of the current offense and measures of previous lawbreaking
to set sentencing standards. This translated to harsher sentences for
women. In Minnesota, policy makers were conscious of the trade-offs.
They decided that it was preferable to endorse the symbolism of
gender-neutral equal treatment than to be concerned with potential increases in sentences for women (Parent 1988). An evaluation of the
first three years of implementing the guidelines suggests that gender
disparities in sentencing were reduced and that women's sentences became more severe (Knapp 1984). Monitoring data from most guideline
systems show the same pattern of increased sentencing severity for
women (e.g., Bogan and Factor 1995, p. 13).
While race- and gender-based disparities may be reduced with
"equal treatment" sentencing policies, there are negative consequences, as well. First, the decision to restrict sentencing criteria to
current and past lawbreaking makes it difficult for judges to mitigate
sentences to take account of offenders' personal circumstances. Since
relatively few felony defendants come from middle-class backgrounds
and close to half are black, an equal treatment policy disadvantages
those poor, minority defendants whose lives show some social and economic success. Second, it is difficult for judges to tailor sentences to
the distinctive demands of justice that are linked to racial, class, and
gender differences. Race and gender relations have different histories
and logics; at the same time, criminal justice policies may also suffer
from viewing race and gender as being on separate tracks. By separatetrack thinking, we mean policies that address what are seen as special
or unique problems of minority group members or of women. How to
imagine the intersections of racial-ethnic and gender relations, while
also appreciating their different logics and demands of justice, will continue to pose dilemmas for crime and justice policy.
This essay examines the sentencing literature with the following
questions in mind. What does the research show? How are race and
gender conceptualized in the criminal process? What are the policy
implications of theory and research in this area? The essay has five
parts. The first summarizes data on arrest, confinement, and sentencing trends by race and by gender over the past two decades. The second surveys the statistical literature on race and gender disparities in
sentencing; the third reviews several theoretical perspectives that have
been proposed for thinking about race-gender intersectionalities; and
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the fourth considers racial and gender politics in sentencing reform.
The last offers recommendations for policy and future research. Before
turning to these discussions at the beginning of Section I we discuss
problems with terms such as "race," "crime," and "justice" and the
limits of available data.
I. Race and Gender in Official Statistics
As anthropologists have long emphasized, "race" does not exist, that
is, "there are no clearly isolatable populations of human beings that
vary from one another significantly on... physical dimensions" (Meneses 1994, p. 139). Race refers instead to socially and historically constructed categories and identities. Like ethnicity and cultural identity,
race may be best understood as a "means of group formation rather
than the cause of it" (p. 141) (see also Georges-Abeyie 1989; Roediger
1991; Hall 1992; Frankenberg 1993; Ang 1995). However much anthropologists, historians, and biological scientists (among others) may
stress that race, as a set of biological categories for human populations,
does not exist, or that ethnic identities are actively constructed without
clear origins or consistent elements, it is difficult to convince people
of these ideas. Meneses (1994, p. 139) suggests that the reason is that
people hold a "firm commitment to a folk theory of race ... because
of the convenience of marking ethnic groups.., with physical features
and because the symbolism of common ancestry . . . is powerful to
maintain ethnic group coherence." In addition to fixed notions of
"race," in the United States, the "black-white" racial dualism obscures
a more complex picture of racial and ethnic relations, especially the
relational histories of Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, African
Americans, and Asian Americans to each other (Mann 1993; Martinez
1993; Takaki 1993; Omi and Winant 1994).
There is a sharp disjuncture between a contextual and socially constructed understanding of race and ethnicity and how statistical data
on crime, courts, and prisons are gathered. Statistical categorization
presumes a fixed quality or "essence" to racial and ethnic differences,
when such differences are more fluid. But even if one wanted to work
with extant statistical categories, the data on racial and ethnic categories may be available in some sources (e.g., arrest and prison populations) but fragmentary or absent in others (e.g., victimization and national court data). This makes comparisons across data sources
difficult. Another major problem is that, with some exceptions, crime
and justice system data lack measures of class standing; thus, analyses
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use "race" as a surrogate for discussing class and crime, when a more
satisfactory approach would be to analyze class and race together. Despite these recognized problems, we use the national data available to
us and the folk theory of race on which the data are based: black and
white as dichotomous race groups, and without reference to class
standing.
"Male" and "female" have a more secure biological referent, and the
statistical categorization of gender groups is somewhat less contentious
than that for race and ethnicity (but for feminist challenges, see Gatens
[1996]). Yet serious problems remain. Arrest and court data examine
race and gender separately, but not together. This is a major problem
because the most interesting analytical and political questions center
on the intersections of race and gender, not merely the separate categories of "black," "white," "male," and "female."
Crime and justice system data are limited by the very terms in which
these phenomena are counted and explained: crime is a state-created
definition and phenomenon. That is not to say that harms of various
types are not "real" or that people do not suffer them, but that certain
harms are more easily counted and detected than others (common law
crimes compared with various organizational and occupational crimes,
or crimes between strangers compared with crimes between intimates)
and that certain offenses become a targeted focus of policing and criminal justice activity. The historical shifts in the meaning and content
of particular crime categories, themselves heterogeneous groupings of
diverse harms, must always be kept in mind.
Although this essay does not address the sociological and philosophical literature on crime, punishment, and justice, we find Hudson's
(1996, pp. 151-52) distinction between punishment and justice a useful
one. She argues that "punishment cannot be a synonym for 'justice' ":
whereas the former concerns the infliction of pain, the latter concerns
"the balance between individual freedom and social responsibility
[and] . . . the fair distribution of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship." When we use the phrase "the distinctive demands of justice," we have in mind a meaning of justice as the "right" response to
the particulars of the harm and the case. We argue that race and gender relations have different histories and logics, and by that we refer
to the mechanisms and practices by which racial and gender oppression
are structured, enacted, reproduced, and challenged. Ultimately, more
"just" decisions in individual cases (or across groups of cases) would
address these broader configurations of inequality. Current sentencing
policy remains rooted in notions of individual responsibility, denying
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the larger societal inequalities and histories of race and gender relations. Within these narrowly circumscribed terms, however, there remain competing demands of racial and gender justice, which scholars
and policy makers have not yet addressed.
A. Arrests
Because arrests are the starting point of the criminal process, they
set basic patterns on which later official decisions embroider. They also
provide the first indication that patterns of lawbreaking differ for
blacks compared with whites and for women compared with men, even
though blacks and women both occupy subordinated social positions.
Arrests do not give an optimal picture of criminal behavior, and no one
is sure how good a picture they do give. Some unlawful behavior results in people being taken into custody, and some takings into custody
result in arrests being officially entered in police records. Policies and
conventions governing such decisions vary over time and place; arrest data are as much a measure of official behavior as of criminal behavior.
Thus, when examining gender, race, and arrest statistics over time,
it is unclear whether apparent shifts in the black or female share of
arrests reflect "real" changes in lawbreaking or changes in police responses to crime. Varied data sources suggest that there are "real" race
and gender differences in crime involvement, especially with street
forms of violent crime (blacks higher and women lower) and elite or
white-collar forms of property crime (men and whites higher) (see
Blumstein 1982; Daly 1989c; Harris and Meidling 1994; Tonry 1995,
pp. 49-80). However, cross-national trend data on gender and arrests
suggest that enhanced police record-keeping practices, coupled with
credit-based currency systems, can explain increases in women's arrests
for the less serious forms of property crime and fraud (Steffensmeier,
Allan, and Streifel 1989; Steffensmeier 1993, 1995).
1. Gender and Arrests. The data on gender and arrests show three
patterns (table 1, pts. A-C).5 First, arrest rates for women are lower
than for men. For all offenses combined, men's arrest rates are over
four times greater than women's. Second, men's and women's arrest
I Our tables are similar to Steffensmeier's (1993, 1995) method of arraying gender
and arrest data in that we group the offense categories to reflect similar clusters of behavior rather than by index and nonindex offenses. Our rates of arrest differ from his,
however, in that our base is the entire U.S. population whereas his is the population
aged ten through sixty-four years. Also, when calculating the female (and black) shares
of arrests, we use the raw numbers, not the arrest rates as Steffensmeier does. Readers
will notice slight differences in our calculations as a result.

TABLE 1
Gender and Arrests
A. Women's Arrest Rates per 100,000, by Offense,
Ranked from Most to Least Frequent, 1994
Rank and Number
of Arrests
Moderate:
546,304
411,331
Moderate-low:
185,111
184,160
153,382
130,239
Low:
74,696
66,271
53,313
33,424
33,305
33,206
20,559
18,057
13,591
Very low:
4,783
2,460
1,839
2,372,426

Rate per 100,000
Female Population

Offense

410
309

All other offenses (except traffic)
Larceny-theft

139
138
115
98

Simple assault
Drug abuse violations
Driving under the influence
Fraud

56
50
40
25
25
25
15
14
10

Aggravated assault
Public drunkenness
Prostitution
Burglary
Vandalism
Forgery and counterfeiting
Motor vehicle theft
Stolen property
Robbery

4
2
1

Embezzlement
Arson
Homicide

1,475

All offenses

B. Men's Arrest Rates per 100,000, by Offense,
Ranked from Most to Least Frequent, 1994
Rank and Number
of Arrests
Very high:
2,499,796
High:
934,186
926,151
824,980
806,770
Moderate:
505,149
475,167
375,020
341,177
286,502
226,274

Rate per 100,000
Male Population

1,967

Offense

All other offenses (except traffic)

735
729
649
635

Drug abuse violations
Driving under the influence
Larceny-theft
Simple assault

398
374
295
268
225
178

Public drunkenness
Disorderly conduct
Aggravated assault
Liquor laws
Burglary
Vandalism
210

TABLE 1 (Continued)
B. Men's Arrest Rates per 100,000, by Offense,
Ranked from Most to Least Frequent, 1994
Rank and Number
of Arrests

Rate per 100,000
Male Population

200,513
196,232
Moderate-low:
145,701
133,388
116,873
Low:
74,991
73,000
59,797
33,505
29,460
16,958
16,658
14,304
9,504,762

Offense

158
154

Fraud
Weapons

115
105
92

Motor vehicle theft
Robbery
Stolen property
Sex offenses
Offenses against family and children
Forgery and counterfeiting
Prostitution
Rape
Vagrancy
Homicide
Arson

59
57
47
26
23
13
13
11

All offenses

7,480

C. Female Share of Arrests, 1975, 1980, 1990, 1994, in Percent

All offenses
Index offenses only:
Violent index
Property index
Offenses against the person:
Homicide
Aggravated assault
Simple assault
Major property:
Robbery
Burglary
Stolen property
Minor property:
Larceny-theft
Fraud
Forgery
Embezzlement
Drinking, drugs, public order:
Public drunkenness
Driving under the influence
Drug abuse violations
Disorderly conduct
Prostitution

1975

1980

1990

1994

16

16

18

20

10
22

10
21

11
25

14
27

16
13
14
7
5
11
31
34
29
31
7
8
14
18
74
211

212
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
D. Offenses Showing the Largest Increase in Women's and
Men's Total Arrests, 1975 and 1994

1975
Women:
Simple assault
Aggravated assault
Liquor laws
Fraud
All other (except traffic)
Drug abuse violations
Men:
Simple assault
Aggravated assault
Liquor laws
Fraud
All other (except traffic)
Drug abuse violations

1994

Rate of Increase
(in Percent)

48,745
26,394
38,124
50,004
167,465
70,060

185,111
74,696
83,275
130,239
546,304
184,160

280
183
118
130
226
163

303,903
175,823
228,933
96,249
870,289
438,129

806,770
375,020
341,177
200,513
2,499,796
934,186

165
113
49
108
187
113

SOURCES.-For pts. A and B: Federal Bureau of Investigation (1995), table 42; U.S.
Department of Commerce (1996), table 12. For pt. C: Federal Bureau of Investigation
(1976), table 38; (1981), table 35; (1991), table 37; (1995), table 42. For pt. D: Federal
Bureau of Investigation (1976), table 38; (1995), table 42.
NOTE.-The arrest rate is calculated from FBI data on arrests by sex and census
data on population by sex (female population = 133,265,000; male population =
127,076,000). The total amounts for both women and men do not equal the amounts
shown in columns; some arrest categories are omitted.

rates are high for driving under the influence, larceny-theft, and a residual set of "other offenses," and they are low for homicide, embezzlement, and arson. Gender differences are evident in the middle
ranges: men's arrest profile contains a higher share of arrests for major
forms of violent and property crime, whereas women's contain a
higher share of arrests for more minor forms of property crime. Third,
while the female share of overall arrests is lower than men's, this share
has increased from 16 to 20 percent from 1975 to 1994. For both men
and women, arrest rates have increased most for simple and aggravated
assault, the residual "other offense" category, drug law violations, and
fraud. The female share of arrests for serious violent offenses (homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery) was 12 percent in 1975 and 1990,
rising to 14 percent in 1994.
2. Race and Arrests. When arrests for blacks and whites are com-
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pared, three patterns stand out (table 2, pts. A-C). First, arrest rates
for blacks are higher than for whites. For all offenses combined, they
are nearly four times higher. Second, blacks' and whites' arrest rates
are high for drug law violations, simple assault, larceny-theft, and a residual set of "other offenses." They are relatively lower for arson, embezzlement, and homicide. There are significant differences. Disorderly conduct and aggravated assault are high-arrest rate offenses for
blacks, whereas driving under the influence is for whites. Third, the
overall black share of arrests has risen from 25 percent of arrests in
1974 and in 1980 to 31 percent in 1994. During the past two decades,
the black share of arrests for most offenses has moved up or down by
only a few percentage points. The major exception is drug law violations: whereas the black share of arrests for this offense category was
20 percent in 1975, it was 41 percent in 1990, dropping a bit to 38
percent in 1994.
3. Gender, Race, and Arrests. Scholars draw from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports data, National Crime
Victimization Survey data, and adolescents' self-reported involvement
in crime and delinquency to analyze race and gender together. This
body of research shows that women are less likely than men to be involved in crime but that black women's involvement is higher than
white women's (Young 1980; Lewis 1981; Mann 1984; Laub and McDermott 1985; Chilton and Datesman 1987; Hill and Crawford 1990;
Simpson 1991). Several studies suggest that, in similar crime situations,
black women are more likely to be arrested than white women (Visher
1983; Smith, Visher, and Davidson 1984). The race-gender hierarchy
from most to least likely to be arrested for common crime (or to be
perceived as an offender) is black men, white men, black women, and
white women. Black-white differences for men and women in rates of
arrest (or perceived race of offender for National Crime Victimization
Survey data) are especially strong for violent crime, but less so for
property crime.
B. Confinement in Prisons andJails
The number of sentenced prisoners in state and federal prisons in
the United States has increased dramatically in the past fifteen years.
In 1980, there were about 330,000 prisoners. By the end of 1995 there
were 1,078,000, more than three times as many (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996). Data on admissions to state prisons reveal three changes
since 1980. First, court commitments are a decreasing share of prison

TABLE 2
Race and Arrests
A. Black Arrest Rates per 100,000, by Offense,
Ranked from Most to Least Frequent, 1994
Rank and Number
of Arrests
Very high:
1,092,034
Very high-high:
429,479
407,231
341,941
High:
199,094
176,062
Moderate:
120,640
107,347
97,867
96,200
89,232
87,531
66,544
59,083
57,575
54,601
Moderate-low:
32,001
30,860
30,242

Rate per 100,000
Black Population

Offense

3,342

All other offenses (except traffic)

1,315
1,246
1,047

Drug abuse violations
Larceny-theft
Simple assault

609
539

Disorderly conduct
Aggravated assault
Fraud
Driving under the influence
Burglary
Drunkenness
Robbery
Weapons
Motor vehicle theft
Vandalism
Liquor laws
Stolen property
Forgery and counterfeiting
Prostitution
Offenses against family and children

12,419
10,420
3,853
3,816

38
32
12
12

3,705,713

11,342

Rape
Homicide
Arson
Embezzlement
All offenses

B. White Arrest Rates per 100,000, by Offense,
Ranked from Most to Least Frequent, 1994
Rank and Number
of Arrests
High:
1,891,312
Moderate:
932,802
796,212
677,025

Rate per 100,000
White Population

Offense

All other offenses (except traffic)
Driving under the influence
Larceny-theft
Drug abuse violations

TABLE 2 (Continued)
B. White Arrest Rates per 100,000, by Offense,
Ranked from Most to Least Frequent, 1994
Rank and Number
of Arrests

Rate per 100,000
White Population

Simple assault
Drunkenness
Disorderly conduct
Liquor laws

625,689
460,300
390,326
352,683
Moderate-low:
264,466
215,363
205,362
Low:
193,538
121,834
95,216
77,709
62,300
59,127
58,427
55,055
53,819
Very low:
16,683
12,555
7,705
7,600

Aggravated assault
Burglary
Fraud
Vandalism
Weapons
Motor vehicle theft
Stolen property
Sex offenses
Forgery and counterfeiting
Offenses against family and children
Robbery
Prostitution
Rape
Arson
Homicide
Embezzlement
3,647

7,894,414

Offense

All offenses

C. Black Share of Arrests, 1975, 1980, 1990, 1994, in Percent

All offenses
Index offenses only:
Violent index
Property index
Offenses against the person:
Homicide
Aggravated assault
Simple assault
Major property:
Robbery
Burglary
Stolen property
Minor property:
Larceny-theft
Fraud

1975

1980

1990

1994

25

25

29

31

44
33

45
30

59
28
34

58
29
32

61
30
41

61
31
41

31
29

31
30

31
33

33
37

215

216
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
C. Black Share of Arrests, 1975, 1980, 1990, 1994, in Percent
Forgery
Embezzlement
Drinking, drugs, public order:
Public drunkenness
Driving under the influence
Drug abuse violations
Disorderly conduct
Prostitution

33
31

33
24

34
32

34
33

19
13
20
30
54

16
11
24
30
53

18
9
41
32
39

17
10
38
33
36

D. Offenses Showing the Largest Increase in Blacks' and
Whites' Total Arrests, 1975 and 1994

Blacks:
Drugs
All other
Simple assault
Fraud
Aggravated assault
Vandalism
Whites:
Simple assault
All other
Aggravated assault
Fraud
Drugs
Weapons

1975

1994

Rate of Increase
(in Percent)

96,660
267,294
113,608
40,476
71,360
25,149

429,479
1,092,034
341,941
120,640
176,062
59,083

344
309
201
198
147
135

217,481
696,160
105,226
99,972
383,649
69,843

625,689
1,891,312
264,466
205,362
677,025
121,834

188
172
151
105
76
74

SOURCEs.-For pts. A and B: Federal Bureau of Investigation (1995), table 42; U.S.
Department of Commerce (1996), table 12. For pt. C: Federal Bureau of Investigation
(1976), table 38; (1981), table 35; (1991), table 37; (1995), table 42. For pt. D: Federal
Bureau of Investigation (1976), table 39; (1995), table 43.
NoTE.-The arrest rate is calculated from FBI data on arrests by race and census
data on population by race (black population = 32,672,000; white population =
216,470,000). The total amounts for both blacks and whites do not equal the amounts
shown in columns; some arrest categories are omitted.

admissions (70 percent in 1992) whereas "conditional release violators" (those who left prison as parolees or by other types of release
involving community supervision) form an increasing share (from 17
percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 1992). Second, court commitments
have increased dramatically for drug offenses, rising from about 2 percent to 10 percent of drug arrests (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994a,
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TABLE 3
Rates per 100,000 of Federal and State Sentenced Prisoners,
by Gender and Race, 1980-1993
Men

Women

Year

Total*

White

Black

White

Black

1980
1984
1990
1993

139
187
297
359

168
228
339
398

1,111
1,459
2,376
2,920

6
9
19
23

45
63
125
165

Rate of increase,
(in percent)
1980-1993

158

137

163

283

267

SoURCE.-Adapted from Bureau of Justice Statistics (1994a), p. 9.
*Total includes prisoners of other racial-ethnic groups.

p. 8). In 1980, 7 percent of new court commitments were for drug offenses; in 1992, it was 31 percent. Third, the black share of those imprisoned has increased from 44 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 1994;
for women, from 4 percent to 6 percent. While the rate of increase in
incarceration has been greatest for black and white women, their increased numbers are a small portion of the overall growth in the size
of the prison population, which has been shouldered disproportionately by black men.
Table 3 shows incarceration rates by race and gender for state and
federal prisoners from 1980 to 1993. Black men's incarceration rate
was six times that of white men's in 1980, seven times that in 1990,
and eight times that in 1993. Black women's incarceration rate was
seven times that of white women's in 1980 and in 1993. Gender differences within racial groups are even more pronounced. Black men's incarceration rate was eighteen times that of black women in 1993 (it
was twenty-five times that of black women in 1980). White men's incarceration rate was seventeen times that of white women in 1993 (it
was twenty-eight times that of white women in 1980).
For men and women in prison in 1991, the median age is thirty to
thirty-one years (table 4). Nearly two-thirds are members of minority
groups (black, Hispanic, Native American, and Asian), and most have
not graduated from high school. Over half the women and 32 percent
of the men were unemployed at the time of arrest. More imprisoned

TABLE 4
Demographic, Offense, and Criminal History Profiles of Men and
Women in State Prisons in 1991 and Jails in 1989 (in Percent)
In Prison

Median age (in years)
Race/ethnicity:
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other
Education:
Eighth grade or less
Some high school
High school graduate or more
Prearrest employment:
Employed
Unemployed, looking
Unemployed, not looking
Offense:
Violent
Property
Drugs:
Possession
Trafficking
Public order
Other
Criminal history:
Not sentenced to probation or incarceration before
Previously sentenced for violent
offense
Previously sentenced for nonviolent
offense
Level of conviction:
No prior record
One conviction
Two or more convictions

In Jail

Men

Women

Men

Women

31

30

28

28

47
25

32
29

24
30

13
32

19

28

22

31

50

26

31

16

31

46

47

52

SoURCEs.-Prison data for 1991 are adapted from Bureau of Justice Statistics
(1994b), pp. 2-4. Jail data for 1989 are adapted from Bureau of Justice Statistics (1992),
pp. 3-6.
NoTE.-The sample sizes on which these percents are based may vary depending on
whether there is complete information. For prison data, the N of women and men is
about 38,700 and 670,000, respectively. For jail, the N is for all inmates, convicted and
not convicted. In 1989, that was about 36,500 women and 344,500 men.
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men (close to half) were in prison for violent offenses than were
women (one-third). More imprisoned women (one-third) were in for
drug offenses than were men (20 percent), although just five years earlier, drug offenses accounted for 11 and 8 percent, respectively, of the
offenses for which women and men were incarcerated. More incarcerated men (50 percent) than women (26 percent) had been previously
convicted of a violent offense, and more men (61 percent) than women
(49 percent) had two or more previous convictions.
In addition to those in prison, there were 507,000 people in U.S.
jails in 1995 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996). Forty-five percent were
convicted and serving sentences; the rest were awaiting trial. The number of adults in local jails more than doubled from 1983 to 1995, and
the increases were greater for women than men. A 1989 survey of inmates in local jails reveals a profile with some similarities and differences from that of prison inmates (table 4). Women were then 9 percent of jail inmates; most men and women (62 percent) were members
of minority groups (black, Hispanic, and Native American/Asian), and
half of women and 46 percent of men had completed high school or
more. Compared to the prison population, fewer men and women
were in jail for violent offenses; they were more likely to be jailed for
public order offenses. Like women prisoners, jailed women were less
likely than their male counterparts to have been sentenced before and
less likely to have been sentenced for a violent crime.

C. Criminal Courts
Compared with data gathered on arrests, on jail and prison inmates,
and on federal criminal courts, a national reporting system for state
criminal courts has taken longer to develop. Four sources are available,
although two have ended recently. These are the Prosecution of Felony Arrests (PFA), Offender-Based Transaction Statistics (OBTS), the
National Judicial Reporting Program (NJRP), and the National Pretrial Reporting Program (NPRP).
The PFA is a county-level program; the OBTS, state-level. Both began in the late 1970s and ended in the early 1990s. The PFA data set
includes a varied number of urban felony courts (ranging from fourteen to thirty-seven), which volunteered to report information on cases
from arrest to disposition (Boland, Brady, et al. 1983; Boland, Conly,
et al. 1990). The PFA statistics give the estimated percent of felony
arrests dismissed and prosecuted, the percent of cases going to trial,
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and the kinds of sentences imposed. Outcomes are not disaggregated
by race or gender.
State participation in the OBTS was voluntary; thus, the completeness of data varies by state.6 The OBTS contains information on outcomes from arrest to sentencing. While the gender and race composition of those prosecuted is reported, sentencing outcomes are not
disaggregated by race or gender.
After several pilot efforts (see, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics 1987),
the NJRP began in 1986 with a sample of state courts in 100 counties;
the sample expanded to state courts in 300 counties in 1988. The
NJRP gathers information on sentences for convicted defendants only.
To supplement the NJRP, the NPRP, which began in 1988, gathers
data on the pretrial status of defendants. The NPRP uses a sample of
the seventy-five largest urban counties, whereas the NJRP uses both a
national sample and courts serving the seventy-five largest urban counties. (We refer to the latter two NJRP samples as the "national" and
"urban-county" samples, respectively.) The data from the NJRP provide the only national source of information on felony court sentences
for race and gender groups.7
We have described these sources of court data in some detail because, depending on which source is consulted, the race and gender
profile varies. Table 5 shows the black and female shares of cases in
1990, drawing from three data sources: the OBTS (table 5, pt. A),
NJRP urban county sample (table 5, pt. B), and NJRP national sample
(table 5, pt. C). In all three samples, 14-15 percent of the defendants
were women. However, the black share of defendants is greater in the
NJRP urban-county sample (table 5, pt. B; 55 percent) than in the
OBTS national sample (table 5, pt. A; 41 percent) or NJRP national
6 An early OBTS report described sentencing practices for thirteen states during
1979-82 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1984). Disposition data from five states were reported for 1983-86 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989b); fourteen for 1988 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1991); and eleven for 1990 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994c). A bureau
senior statistician says that the OBTS series data generally reflect justice system practices
in California because of its population in comparison to other OBTS states (Langan
1995).
' Bureau of Justice Statistics researchers suggest that comparisons of 1986 and 1990
using the national data should be made with care because the 1986 sample comes from
only 100 counties. They recommend comparisons using the urban county samples (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1993b, p. 7). We prefer the national sample for two reasons: it
has data for 1986, and it disaggregates sentences by race and gender. One problem is
that the 1986 data provide less detailed offense categories than those in later years. This
can be circumvented by selecting offense categories common to 1986 and subsequent
years.
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TABLE 5
Black and Female Percentages of Defendants Prosecuted in Felony
Courts in 1990 as Estimated from Three National Sources of Data
A. Offender-Based Transaction Statistics Data for 1990 from 11 States

No. Prosecuted
518,929

Black
Female
Share
6

White
Female
Share
8

Black
Male
Share

White
Male
Share

Other
Share

35

50

1

B. National Judicial Reporting Program Data for 1990, Sample of 75
Urban Counties

All Offenses
50,444

Black
Female
Share
8

White
Female
Share
7

Black
Male
Share

White
Male
Share

Other
Share

47

37

2

C. National Judicial Reporting Program Data for 1990, National Sample of 300
Counties

All Cases (Estimated)
713,000

Female
Share

Male
Share

Black
Share

White
Share

Other
Share

14

86

47

52

1

SOURCES.-In pt. A, Offender-Based Transaction Statistics data are from Bureau of
Justice Statistics (1994c), p. 3. In pt. B, National Judicial Reporting Program data are
from Bureau of Justice Statistics (199 3c), p. 3. In pt. C, National Judicial Reporting Program data are from Bureau of Justice Statistics (19 93a), p. 16.
NoTE.-"Other Share" = Native American and Asian men and women. The 11
states in pt. A are Alabama, Alaska, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Virginia.

sample (table 5, pt. C; 47 percent). It is not surprising that the urbancounty sample has a higher percent of blacks because of the demographics of urban populations. What is important is that the race and
gender composition of defendants in state felony courts is characterized accurately.
In light of the differences in how court data have been gathered, an
accurate analysis of sentencing trends cannot be stitched together with
OBTS data from the early 1980s and NJRP data from the mid-1980s
onward. We therefore focus on the 1986 and 1990 NJRP national sample data (see tables 6-8). From 1986 to 1990, the female share of defendants remained the same (13-14 percent). The black share in-
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TABLE 6
The Female and Black Shares of Those Convicted in Felony Courts,
1986-90, Using the National Judicial Reporting Program
National Sample
Female Share

All felonies (in percent)
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
Aggravated assault
Burglary
Larceny
Drug sales ("trafficking")
Other felonies

Black Share

1986

1990

1986

1990

13
9
1
6
9
4
20
14
17

14
10
1
6
9
5
18
15
10

40
46
37
53
44
38
38
48
37

47
56
33
63
44
42
42
57
33

SouRCE s-For 1986, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1990), p. 3; for 1990, Bureau of
Justice Statistics (1993a), p. 16.
NoTE -The 1986 and 1990 data are not strictly comparable in that more detailed
offense categories are available in 1990. Thus, the "other felonies" share drops in 1990.
In 1986, the larceny category included both larceny and fraud, but in 1990 larceny and
fraud were separated.

creased from 40 to 47 percent (table 6), with the largest increases being
for homicide (46 to 56 percent), robbery (53 to 63 percent), and drug
sales (48 to 57 percent). (The Bureau of Justice Statistics uses the term
"drug trafficking," but we use "drug sales" or "selling drugs.") Within
race and gender groups, the drug sales share of court convictions increased from 13 to 20 percent of men's convictions, 15 to 22 percent
of women's, 10 to 17 percent of whites', and 14 to 25 percent of blacks'
(see table 7).
Turning to the sentences received (table 8, pts. A and B), several
caveats are in order. First, although the severity of the offense and the
defendant's prior record are typically the strongest factors, sentencing
is based on a complex mix of case and biographical elements. Second,
the averages reported for length of sentence combine defendants who
pleaded guilty and those who were found guilty at trial. Defendants
convicted at trial are likely to receive more severe sentences than those
pleading guilty; previous research suggests that gender and race groups
may have different mixes of trial and guilty plea sentences.8
' Zatz (1987, pp. 79-80) finds that black offenders were less likely to resolve their
cases through plea bargaining than whites. Daly (1994a, p. 19) estimates a higher pleabargaining rate for women (97 percent) than men (92 percent).
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TABLE 7
The Distribution of Convicted Offenses, by Gender and Race,
1986-90, Using the National Judicial Reporting Program
National Sample
Women

Men

Homicide, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault
Burglary, larceny, motor
vehicle theft
Drug sale
Other felonies

White

Black

1986

1990

1986

1990

1986

1990

1986

1990

20

17

9

8

22

17

17

15

35
13
32

28
20
35

30
15
46

24
22
46

34
14
30

25
25
33

37
10
36

30
17
38

SOURCEs.-For 1986, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1990), p. 3; for 1990, Bureau of
Justice Statistics (1993a), p. 17.
NoTE.-All percents sum to 100. Only those offense categories that can be compared
for 1986 and 1990 are shown, leaving a large "other felonies" category. The estimated
number of convictions in 1986 was 582,764; in 1990, 829,344.

From 1986 to 1990, the percent of defendants receiving a prison or
jail sentence rose a little from 67 to 71 percent, although the average
(mean) sentence length was largely unchanged (fifty-eight to fifty-two
months). In 1986, there was a 20 percentage point "gender gap" in
incarceration: 70 percent of men were sentenced to prison or jail compared with 50 percent of women. That gap decreased to 17 percentage
points in 1990. For men, the likelihood of imprisonment rose most
sharply for drug sales (65 to 79 percent) with only slight increases for
most other offenses. For women, increases were also strongest for drug
sales (from 53 to 69 percent), although also sizable for aggravated assault and robbery.
Compared with the incarceration gender gap, that for race was
smaller: in 1986 and 1990, the incarceration rate for blacks was 2-3
percentage points higher than for whites. For blacks, increases in incarceration were marked for drug sales (up from 67 to 78 percent) and
aggravated assault (66 to 75 percent). For whites, incarceration sentences for drug sales rose from 56 to 77 percent. The "race gap" in
incarceration for drugs thus declined from an 11-percentage-point difference in 1986 to near parity in 1990.
All groups in 1990 were more likely to receive an incarceration sentence than in 1986, but as table 8, part B, shows, the mean sentence
length dropped substantially for whites (sixty-two to forty-five
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months), but not for blacks (down one month). Average sentence
lengths for men and women declined by six months between 1986 and
1990. The gender gap in length of sentence in both years was eighteen
months with the largest gaps for homicide and robbery. As Part B of
table 8 also shows, the racial gap in length of sentence, though negligible in 1986, widened in 1990. The largest black-white gaps were for
those sentenced for rape and aggravated assault.
Because there have been significant shifts in sentencing for drug selling, we examine them for race and gender groups (table 9). From 1986
to 1992, the percentage of drug sale cases receiving an incarceration
sentence increased from 64 to 75 percent, the average sentence length
increasing eight months. While the race gap in proportions receiving
an incarceration sentence closed for both men and women, the race
gap in sentence length reversed by 1992: it was twenty-six and twelve
months longer, respectively, for black men and black women compared
with their white counterparts. The gender gap for blacks and whites
receiving incarceration sentences is still wide (at 14-15 percentage
points), as is the gender gap in length of sentence for black defendants.
The arrest, court, and incarceration data show that for all race and
gender groups, drug-related offenses have become an increasing share
of arrests and felony court cases, and they have become increasingly
subject to sentences of incarceration. In a very short period of time,
jail and prison populations have ballooned with inmates serving time
for drug-related offenses. What, then, is happening in felony courts?
We turn to that research literature to see if it suggests patterns of racial
and gender bias.
II. Research on Race and Gender in Criminal Courts
Statistical sentencing studies show that the strongest and most consistent predictors of outcomes are the severity of the offense charged and
the defendant's criminal history. By comparison, defendant attributes
such as race, gender, or age do not exert as strong or as consistent effects. While statistical studies can provide important information on
the court process, they do not give the whole picture. Such studies
show whether average sentences are more or less severe for some
groups, after controlling for levels of offense severity, criminal history,
and other variables, than for other groups. However, a finding of no
group differences (no "race" or "sex effects") does not mean that race
and gender do not powerfully influence the criminal process and the
experiences of victims, offenders, attorneys, and judges.

TABLE 9
Sentencing for Drug Sale, by Gender and Race, 1986-92, Using the
National Judicial Reporting Program National Sample
A. Percent Receiving Incarceration Sentences and Length of Sentence
For All Groups
Percent of drug sale cases
receiving incarceration
Length of incarceration (in
months)

1986

1992

64

75

42

50
Black
Men

Percent of drug sale cases
receiving incarceration
Length of incarceration
sentence (in months;
prison and jail)

Black
Women

White
Men

White
Women

1986

1992

1986

1992

1986

1992

1986

1992

69

80

56

66

56

82

55

67

39

61

27

43

42

35

61

31

B. Gender and Race Gaps in Incarceration Sentences Imposed and
Length of Sentences*
1986

1992

Gender gap, incarceration
sentence imposed:
Blacks
13
14
Whites
1
15
Gender gap, length of sentence imposed:
Blacks
12
18
Whites
19t
4
Race gap, incarceration
sentence imposed:
Men
13
2t
Women
1
it
Race gap, length of sentence imposed:
Men
3t
26
Women
34t
12
SOURCE.-Data were provided by Patrick Langan (Bureau of Justice Statistics).
* Unless otherwise indicated, the size of the gap shows the more severe sanction for
men than women, and for blacks than whites.
t More severe for women than men, or for whites than blacks.
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The following review of the court literature focuses on court outcomes, not on the processes that led to those decisions. Specifically, we
are not reviewing the body of observational and interview studies that
explore "the [ethnographic] jungle" of legal decision making (Hawkins
1986, p. 1242). We are also passing over research on court organizational and political contexts (e.g., Eisenstein and Jacob 1977; Blumberg
1979; Nardulli, Eisenstein, and Flemming 1988) and sociohistorical
analyses of the relationship between punishment and social structure
(see Melossi and Pavarini 1981; Garland 1990, 1991; Melossi 1990;
Bridges and Beretta 1994; Howe 1994).
A. Race and the Criminal Courts
Those new to the criminal court literature find it hard to believe
that statistical sentencing studies normally do not find "race effects"
favoring whites (for reviews, see Kleck [1981]; Hagan and Bumiller
[1983]; Wilbanks [1987]). How could it be that black men and women
are 50 percent of those inside prison but only 12 percent of those outside
without something questionable taking place in the criminal courts?
Racial disparities have been documented for capital punishment in the
South before the Furman v. Georgia decision in 1972 (Kleck 1981).
With the reintroduction of the death penalty in the late 1970s, legal
claims have centered on race-of-victim discrimination and the victimoffender relationship, not the defendant's race alone (see Baldus,
Woodworth, and Pulaski 1990).
Kleck's (1981) review of studies up through the 1970s found that, of
twenty-three that controlled in some way for the defendant's prior record, 56 percent found no "race effects" favoring whites. "Mixed effects," defined as one-third to one-half of the study outcomes finding
race effects favoring whites, were apparent in 35 percent of studies.
The remaining two of the twenty-three studies (or 9 percent) found
race effects favoring whites (table 10). More recent appraisals of the
literature have produced contention about the quality and interpretation of evidence (see, e.g., Blumstein et al. 1983, chap. 2; Kempf and
Austin 1986; Wilbanks 1987; MacLean and Milovanovic 1990; Myers
1993; Reiner 1993; Smith 1994). Spohn (1994, p. 249) depicts researchers as falling into two camps: those arguing that racial disparity
has declined and its importance is negligible compared to other case
factors, and those arguing that disparity has not declined but is more
difficult to detect.
Zatz (1987), a member of the latter camp, identifies four research
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TABLE 10
Findings of "Race Effects" and "Sex Effects" in Sentencing,
in Percent (Excluding Studies of the Death Penalty)
Race and Sentencing
(Kieck 1981)

Do Effects Favor
Whites or Women?
Yes
Mixed*
No

Gender and Sentencing
(Daly and Bordt 1995)

All
Studies
(N = 40)

Control for
Prior Record
(N = 23)

All
Cases
(N = 50)

Control for
Prior Record
(N = 38)

20
30
50

9
35
56

52
24
24

45
29
26

* "Mixed" refers to cases where one-third to one-half of the outcomes showed effects
favoring whites (Kleck) or women (Daly and Bordt).

waves on race and sentencing: studies conducted up to the mid-1960s
(wave 1), those in the late 1960s and 1970s (wave 2), studies in the
1970s and 1980s (wave 3), and those in the 1980s (wave 4). Wave 1
is characterized by findings of "overt discrimination against minority
defendants" (Zatz 1987, p. 70). Reanalysis of these studies during wave
2 showed that, except for the imposition of the death penalty in the
South, initial findings of disparity resulted from unsophisticated statistical analyses that, among other problems, lacked controls for criminal
history. Wave 3 research used data from courts in the late 1960s and
1970s, and with more sophisticated analyses found evidence of "both
overt and more subtle forms of bias against minority defendants... in
some social contexts" (Zatz 1987, p. 70). In wave 4, studies did not find
overt forms of bias, but subtle forms were apparent.
One of Zatz's major points-that court processing is "systematically
biased due to institutionalized discrimination" (p. 81) so that the effect
of race may be "indirect" or "subtle" (rather than overt) through routine court practices-anticipates a mode of analysis we consider later.
Another of Zatz's points-that studies of court process may themselves
be stacked against a finding of racial disparity-can be summarized
here: statistical analyses may do a poor job of modeling adjudication
processes and detecting various forms of disparity because they focus
on discrete outcomes rather than on cumulative and structural effects
of disadvantage.
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B. Gender and the Criminal Courts
Compared to race effects, sex effects are more often found in statistical sentencing studies. Reviews of the literature up to the early 1980s
(Parisi 1982; Nagel and Hagan 1983) found that gender differences
more often arose in the pretrial release and sentencing decisions, but
not in other court contexts.
A more recent appraisal of statistical sentencing by Daly and Bordt
(1995) analyzed fifty unique data sets from studies published through
mid-1990. They found that, of thirty-eight cases that controlled in
some way for prior record, 26 percent found no sex effects, 29 percent
found mixed effects, and 45 percent found effects favoring women (table 10). Statistical procedures mattered: multivariate analyses that controlled for a variety of variables, especially prior record, attenuated
findings of sex effects. But even with such controls, sex effects were
common.
Because the quality of the studies varied, a quality score was assigned
and used to weight the cases. An analysis of the weighted sample
showed that sex effects were more likely when the court analyzed was
a felony court, when the jurisdiction was urban, and when a single jurisdiction was studied. Sex effects were more likely for the "in-out"
(incarceration or not) decision than for sentence length. The magnitude of the gap for the in-out decision was explored in the higherquality studies: after statistical controls were introduced, the gap
ranged from 8 to 25 percentage points. As to temporal effects, there
appeared to be no relationship between the time period of data collection and findings of sex effects. Sex effects were as evident in more
recent court disposition data sets (1976 to 1985) as in those prior to
1976. (Note that subsequent studies of jurisdictions with sentencing
guidelines are few in number and that they show mixed findings: sex
effects in imprisonment were evident in Pennsylvania and the federal
system [Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel 1993; Nagel and Johnson
1994] but not in Minnesota [Miethe and Moore 1985].)
Although the race and sentencing literature rarely grapples with
gender (beyond introducing sex as a control variable), the gender and
sentencing literature has been more attentive to race. The very first
multivariate study of gender and race in sentencing was published only
a decade ago (Gruhl, Welch, and Spohn 1984). That and subsequent
quantitative studies generally find gender differences within race
groups but not racial or ethnic differences within gender groups (see
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the review in Daly [1989b] and studies by Kruttschnitt [1980-81,
1982a, 1982b]; Mann [1984]; Spohn, Welch, and Gruhl [1985]; and
Bickle and Peterson [1991]). From the handful of studies available, it
appears that the gender gap may be widest or more often statistically
significant for black defendants.
C. Is the StatisticalSentencing LiteratureMisleading?
The race and sentencing literature suggests that race has little effect
on sentencing outcomes whereas the gender and sentencing literature
suggests that gender bias is present but apparently working to women's
advantage. Is there something wrong with these studies?
Sample selection bias is a major statistical concern; earlier screening
processes in the handling of black and white cases may attenuate findings of race effects at later stages of court processing (Klepper, Nagin,
and Tierney 1983). If, for example, prosecutors screened out more of
the less serious white than black robbery cases at an earlier stage, the
white robbery cases remaining would be, on average, more serious
than the black robbery cases. A finding of "no race effects" at sentencing in this jurisdiction might be interpreted as indicating that black and
white cases were treated the same, yet it does not reflect the cumulative
advantage accorded whites (i.e., a higher rate of case dismissal or
charge reduction).
Other related concerns are how race operates indirectly in the sentencing process (e.g., via the bail decision or type of attorney representing the defendant), how race interacts with case factors (e.g., the
type of offense charged and prior record; see Zatz [1984, 1985]), how
race affects sentencing for certain types of defendants or victimoffender relations, and how race differences may depend on characteristics of courts and communities (for reviews, see Reiner [1993]; Myers
[1994]; and Spohn [1994]).
Statistical controls themselves may also render important racelinked sentencing elements invisible. One example is the policy decision embodied in the federal sentencing guidelines (and in some states)
to impose more severe penalties on those convicted of crack compared
with powdered cocaine. Because crack is more often sold by blacks, and
powder by whites, the harshest penalties were largely experienced by
blacks (see McDonald and Carlson [1993] and Tonry [1995, pp. 18890] for more discussion). Thus, depending on how a study is conducted, a multivariate analysis may not pick up the embeddedness of
race or ethnicity in offense and statutory severity categories.
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For gender, the statistical problems are the same, but the genderembeddedness in offense variables may be even more pronounced.
Specifically, the sources of variation in the character and content of
men's and women's offenses and their criminal histories may be especially poorly measured. For example, suppose that male crack dealers
typically dealt in larger quantities than female dealers. This might occur if men typically held higher positions in distribution networks or if
more women sold small quantities to support a habit. Even a statistical
analysis that controlled for many variables, including the statutory
code of the conviction offense, might show that men were sentenced
more harshly than women. Unless data were also available on drug
quantities and on individuals' drug trafficking roles, the analysis might
well (but wrongly) conclude that women were sentenced more leniently than men for these drug charges.
From Uniform Crime Report arrest data and NJRP felony court
data, we know that the female share of arrests or court cases for serious
interpersonal violence is low. It has been asserted, more generally, that
across the spectrum of lawbreaking, women engage in less serious
forms of crime and play less culpable roles than men (see, e.g., Steffensmeier 1980). Perhaps because the claim that women's lawbreaking
is less serious than men's seems so self-evident, there have been few
studies that have documented gender variation in crime contexts and
content. They include Daly and Wilson (1987), Jurik and Gregware
(1991), and Polk and Ranson (1991) on homicide, and Daly (1989c) for
selected white-collar offenses.
Recent research suggests that, with better information on the nature
of the offense and the defendant's prior criminal history, statistical sex
effects are eroded. For example, Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel
(1993, p. 437) found that by introducing more precise control variables, the magnitude of sex effects in the decision to incarcerate was
reduced from about 20 to 9 percentage points. Daly's (1994a) multivariate analysis of felony court sentences in New Haven, Connecticut,
found a gender gap of 17 percentage points in the decision to incarcerate, but in a subsequent analysis of a smaller, deep sample of forty pairs
of men and women, who were convicted of similar statutory offenses,
there were negligible (though not entirely absent) gender disparities.
From Daly and Bordt's (1995) review, we learned that sex effects
were more evident in felony courts than in courts prosecuting less serious offenses or a mix of felonies and misdemeanors. This implies that
sources of variation in men's and women's offenses are poorly mea-
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sured for the more serious types of crimes. That inference was borne
out in the New Haven felony court studied by Daly (1994a): while 48
percent of the forty pairs in the deep sample committed crimes of comparable seriousness, 40 percent of men's offenses were more serious
than the women's, and 12 percent of the women's were more serious
than the men's.9 In courts that dispose of the less serious types of offenses (e.g., Feeley 1979; Eaton 1986), there appears to be less statistical evidence of leniency toward women. One reason may be the kinds
of offenses handled and how variation in seriousness is "controlled for"
in a statistical sense.
There is, of course, more to the story of gender and sentencing than
the need to improve statistical procedures. Like race and sentencing,
but in a different way, the added question is how gender-linked criteria
are embedded in decisions and whether such criteria are warranted or
not (see also Raeder 1993; Nagel and Johnson 1994; Daly 1995; Federal
Sentencing Reporter 1995). One example is a defendant's ties to and responsibilities for others, which may be used to mitigate sentences for
familied defendants (those caring for or supporting others) and especially familied women (Eaton 1986; Daly 1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b).
Federal judges' concerns for not incarcerating "good family men" were
apparent in preguidelines interviews with judges (Wheeler, Mann, and
Sarat 1988). The logic in both instances is consequentialist and materialist: by separating mothers (or fathers) from families, children (or
other dependents) lose sources of care and economic support. Women,
more often than men, are involved in day-to-day care for others, and,
depending on the offense and prior criminal history, they may benefit
from this decision criterion.
A second gender-linked criterion is women's greater reform potential. Our review of jail and prison profiles showed that women do not
return to court on new offenses as often as men do. We cannot be sure,
of course, what part of men's more enhanced criminal histories and
higher rates of recidivism is explained by state actors' behavior (e.g.,
the police or parole officials), by that of male lawbreakers, or by a combination of the two. We are somewhat more sure that court officials
assume that women are more easily deterred than men and that women
'These summary percents can give the misleading impression that judgments of seriousness can be made easily across diverse harms. They cannot. Four chapters in Daly
(1994a) discuss how to quantify and compare criminal acts for the deep sample of forty
matched pairs. Gender differences in seriousness were most striking for the robbery and
interpersonal violence cases and less so for the larceny and drug offense cases.
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will make greater efforts to reform themselves (Daly 1987a, 1989a,
1994a).
The statistical literature can therefore mislead in several ways: it can
suggest that race differences are absent when they are present and that
gender differences are strongly present when they are absent. Raceand gender-linked elements in criminal law, coupled with utilitarian
and consequentialist decision-making, add both statistical and conceptual complications. Race and gender may be embedded in criminal law
in ways that they should not be, and race and gender may be embedded
in decision-making processes in ways that may be warranted and unwarranted.
III. Conceptualizing Race and Gender in Court Practice
Theoretical discussions of race and sentencing have drawn largely
from conflict and labeling-interactionist perspectives. Both assume that
relations of inequality and disadvantage in the wider society will be reproduced and reenacted, and perhaps amplified, in the criminal court
(for classical statements, see Schur 1971; Quinney 1974). Thus, the
simple hypothesis of discrimination is that minority group members will
experience harsher outcomes than do majority group members. Today,
that hypothesis has been transformed to a context-dependent one as
scholars argue for more sophisticated ways to detect and identify racial
disparity. Such attempts to transform and reconfigure conflict and
labeling-interactionist theories will continue to run into problems,
however, without a better appreciation of how relations of race and
ethnicity operate in criminal law and justice system processes.
One problem is an overly simplified dual model of majority-minority relations (i.e., advantaged/disadvantaged). How can a dual model
be used to analyze the experiences of several racial and ethnic minority
groups? Leiber's (1994) analysis of Native American, African American, and white youth at several stages of juvenile court process is instructive. He proposes that, while "Native Americans and African
Americans are disproportionately two of the poorest, least educated,
and most highly unemployed groups in the U.S .... the conditions of
Native Americans are described as the most appalling" (Leiber 1994,
p. 260). Thus, Leiber takes the simple hypothesis of discrimination and
heaps a second layer of disadvantage for Native Americans. But when
he reviews the sparse literature on Native Americans and the justice
system, he questions whether his assumption of double disadvantage is
correct. He finds that "stereotypes associated with [Native Americans
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charged with] drug or alcohol offenses... may affect the likelihood of
receiving either harsher or more lenient outcomes" (p. 262), and he
further suggests that African-American youth may be viewed as more
"dangerous" in comparison to Native Americans. Specifying the direction of court leniency or harshness is not straightforward in a multiethnic frame (see also Hagan 1977).
For gender and sentencing, the simple hypothesis of discrimination
is rarely used. Because bivariate outcomes show that women are "favored," the hypothesis that women's disadvantage in the wider society
reproduces itself in the criminal court has not made sense. In its place
have been several ad hoc efforts to explain apparent leniency toward
women when it occurred: first came chivalry (Pollak 1950); then, judicial paternalism toward women (Nagel and Weitzman 1971). Next,
perhaps to generate a sense of debate, Simon (1975) suggested that
some women might be treated leniently and others harshly (or as "evil
women") if they violated certain "sex-role stereotypes." Despite efforts
to clarify the meaning of chivalry, paternalism, and evil women (see
Moulds 1980; Nagel and Hagan 1983), these concepts lack an empirical referent and analytic bite.
Kruttschnitt (1980-81, 1982a, 1982b, 1984) and Kruttschnitt and
Green (1984) developed more sophisticated arguments that drew from
Black's (1976) ideas on law and social control. She suggested that, because women were more subject to informal social control in their lives
than men (via their dependency on others or the state), they would be
subject to less formal social control. Subsequent work by Daly (1987a,
1987b, 1989a, 1989b) outlined and tested a social control/social costs
framework. Daly noted that, although Kruttschnitt's social control formulation explained variation in the treatment among men or women,
it could not explain differential treatment between them; further, Daly
argued that women's caretaking responsibility for others was the more
crucial source of informal social control than their dependency on others. These arguments attempted to clarify how economic support and
care for others could produce variable responses both among and between men and women. One as yet unsettled policy question is
whether this family-based logic is acceptable.
More recent work by Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel (1993) and
Daly (1994a) centers on gender differences in the social organization
of lawbreaking and criminal history, in addition to elements of women's past and present lives that, in comparison to men, make women
appear to be less blameworthy, more conforming, and better prospects
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for reform. Apparent "sex effects" seen in previous studies can be
viewed as arising from inadequate control variables and as warranted
or explicable in light of court officials' consequentialist logic. In exploring the intersection of race and gender, Daly (1994a) found that
black men stood out as the defendant group most at risk to receive the
heaviest penalties. Their biographies were least likely to be constructed
with a blurred boundaries theme of victimization and criminalization,

they were most likely to be categorized as troublemakers or as committed to street life, and they were least likely to be seen as reformable.
The simple hypothesis of discrimination, founded on the dualism of
advantaged-disadvantaged defendants, has proved unsatisfactory in understanding race, gender, and criminal process. Part of the problem is
that the kinds of offenses subject to arrest and prosecution in state

courts ensnare a predominantly disadvantaged population. To explain
how court officials exercise discretion toward this already marginalized
group requires a consideration of the cues and categories that officials

use in assessing defendants' danger to others, of their conventionality
and indispensability for families, and of their desire to change and
"help themselves." A defendant's prior record, which is a powerful cue
for officials in differentiating the amount of respect that defendants
hold for the law and their degree of commitment to the "street life,"
may override individual circumstances that sometimes mitigate sentences.
Three broad modes of conceptualizing race and gender in criminal
law and justice system practices have been adopted by social science
and sociolegal scholars. These are law and practices as racist/sexist,
white/male, and racialized/gendered (Daly [1994b], adapting in part
from Smart [1992]). ° Virtually all empirical work on race and gender
disparities (and our assessment of it) is framed within a racist/sexist
perspective in that the research centers on whether sanctions are applied differently across varied racial-ethnic, gender groups. However,
a new generation of feminist and critical race scholars has raised questions about the limits this conceptualization imposes on theory, research, and policy; they are more likely to embrace the latter two
modes.
" Reiner (1993) and Smith (1994) discuss other ways of analyzing racial discrimination. Their comparison and ours is similar in emphasizing the limitations of individualbased models and the need to consider the disparate impact of law and policies on disadvantaged groups. Our analysis departs from theirs, however, in that they fail to address
the different demands of justice that a joint consideration of race and gender raise.
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A. Sexist/Racist Modes
Analysts using a practices-as-racist-and-sexist perspective focus on
ways of exposing differential treatment and eradicating it. Differential
treatment is seen as synonymous with discrimination. The concern is
that racial and ethnic minority group men and all women may be allocated fewer resources, may be judged by different standards, and may
be denied opportunities. The corrective is "race-blind" and "genderblind" justice that treats all those before the court equally.
Critical race theorists challenge this position because, as they point
out, racial dominance can be achieved in at least two ways: in an older
form, by overtly racist practices, and in a newer form, by practices that
are ostensibly race-neutral. As Cook (1992, p. 1007) explains, the former "predicate[s] subordination on difference," and the latter "predicate[s] subordination on sameness." Likewise, feminist legal theorists
have criticized older, overtly sexist, and newer ostensibly genderneutral practices (MacKinnon 1987; Fineman 1991; Vogel 1993). Critical and feminist theorists are therefore more likely to adopt one of the
other two conceptualizations. 11
B. White/Male Modes
Practices-as-white-and-male proponents assume that the point of
view of criminal law and justice system practices is white, middle-class,
and male (Greene 1990, 1993; Roberts 1991; Austin 1992; Peller
1993). The precise elements of a "white point of view" (often referred
to as "institutionalized racism") have not been clarified for justice system practices to the same extent that the "male point of view" has.
One problem is that "whiteness" has both class and cultural dimensions. It includes notions of what constitutes appropriate dress, demeanor, ways of speaking, and child-rearing practices; it means believing that existing rules and authorities are legitimate and fair.
When practices-as-white-and-male proponents claim that law has a
"point of view," the claim may be easily denied by law and its agents
as outside the realm of acceptable legal discourse. That is because the
claim undermines the principles on which law and normal science are
built: objectivity and neutrality-the reputedly unbiased "view from
nowhere" (Bordo 1990, p. 133). One way to reveal the "point of view"
of law is to show that apparently neutral laws or practices can have a
" Liberal feminists would be more comfortable with the practices-as-racist-and-sexist
formulation.
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disparate effect. Examples include the following: white/male justice
cannot "hear" or empathize with stories of harm (Culp 1992; Daly
1994b); white/male justice overcriminalizes (the War on Drugs is a
current example; see Tonry [1995, chap. 3] and discussion below); and
white/male justice expects lawbreakers easily to conform to conventional behavior patterns and norms (Carlen 1988; Finnegan 1990; Austin 1992).
There are several problems with the justice-as-white-and-male position. First, it may be misleading to assume that white men "benefit or
are celebrated in a rehearsal of practices that claim universality"
(adapting from Smart [1992, p. 34]). Second, the argument may be unduly color-coding and gendering practices that are also linked to nation, culture, and class. Third, there are no coherent or unified conceptions of black, multiethnic, or feminist justice waiting in the wings
to replace current laws and practices.
C. Racialized/GenderedModes
The practices-as-racialized-and-gendered position assumes that race
and gender relations structure criminal law and justice system practices
so profoundly that legal subjects are saturated with racializing and gendered qualities. Majority group members do not always benefit, nor are
women and minority group men always subordinated. Rather than analyzing race-ethnic or gender variability in justice system outcomes,
the focus instead is on how race-ethnicity and gender are brought forth
as racialized and gendered subject positions by criminal law and justice
system practices. In taking this perspective, scholars analyze how criminal law and justice system practices may only be able to "see and think
a gendered [and racialized] subject" (Smart 1992, p. 34).
One problem with the law-and-practices-as-racialized-and-gendered
position is that it may produce knowledge that appears to be useless
for changing policy or directing social change more generally. It is one
thing to appreciate how people and texts are drenched in racialized and
gendered codes and metaphors but quite another to know what to do
with that knowledge. The position is important, however, for challenging the idea that race or gender are attached to people's bodies as a
natural or stable characteristic (see Lubiano 1992). There is also an
openness to seeing how minority group members can construct racialized and gendered identities that both subvert and confirm dominant group members' expectations.
While differences in theory and method may divide traditional and
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more critical sociolegal scholars, there is a shared interest in redressing
patterns of racial and gender injustice. All three modes have strategic
value, even if the first is the most practical and familiar for those in the
policy world. For example, one may only be able to argue from a practices-as-racist position in a legal brief claiming discrimination against
blacks in the imposition of the death penalty (Baldus, Woodworth, and
Pulaski 1990, 1994). Legal arguments from a practices-as-male position can be effective, however, in challenging the presumptively "gender-free world" of the federal sentencing guidelines (Raeder 1993),
and analyses from a practices-as-racialized-and-gendered position reveal that gender (and race) relations are constitutive of law (Smart
1989). Empirical studies of race and gender in the criminal process,
which are typically framed within the racist/sexist mode, could be
more effective by revealing the point of view of criminal law and justice
system practices, including the disparate effect of particular laws and
policies.
TV. Race and Gender Politics in Sentencing Reform
Although in the previous section we used race/gender as an analogous
couplet, the histories and logics of the social relations themselves differ. Before drawing out the implications of that point for sentencing
reform, we discuss how black feminist scholars have theorized the
race/gender relation. 2
A. Black Feminist Challenges
One classic black feminist reaction to the literary and historical literature of the 1960s and 1970s sets the stage: "All the women are white,
all the blacks are men, but some of us are brave" (Hull, Scott, and
Smith 1980). The point is that separate theorizing "about race" or
"about gender" does not resonate with the history or experiences of
black women. The second and perhaps more crucial point is that white
people are racialized, and men, gendered. Thus, while "blacks" and
"women" are marked as being on the subordinate side of race and gender relations, there is more to race and gender than a discussion of its
subordinated members (see, e.g., Frankenberg [1993] on whiteness and
Jefferson [1994] and Messerschmidt [1993] on masculinity). In particular, many black feminists named a theoretical construct of class-race12Black feminist scholarship in the United States and elsewhere is prodigious, although little of it has moved into criminology (for reviews, see Rice 1990; Daly 1993;
Daly and Stephens 1995).
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gender to argue that these three relations were connected and intersecting, and unless all were considered, an understanding of inequality was incomplete (see, e.g., Crenshaw 1989; Collins 1990; hooks
1990).
From a black feminist perspective, the ways that sentencing reform
has been discussed will invite the refrain "but some of us are brave."
When sentencing reformers discuss race, they invariably focus on
white and racial-ethnic minority group men. When they discuss gender, they do not differentiate by race or ethnicity.
B. Sentencing Reform
As race and gender politics unfolded in sentencing reform, race was
structured by presumptive masculinity, and gender, when it was discussed, was nonracialized. American sentencing reform in the 1970s
was spawned by and wholly constructed through a race- (and, to some
degree, class-) based politics. When women entered the frame, sentencing reformers were hemmed in by a "strong equality" stance that
had emerged from these politics.
A partial and highly schematic history of punishment in the United
States would go this way. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
an optimistic rehabilitation-oriented ethos emerged based on individualized treatment and a forward-looking approach to punishment. Indeterminate sentences allowed for discretion by judges, probation officers, and parole boards to decide whether and when individuals were
reformed or not a threat to community safety. These practices became
politicized in the late 1960s. Of concern were apparent abuses of state
officials' powers of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing; class-based disparities in criminal law; and racial disparities in sentences received and
time spent incarcerated. Radical and liberal commentators called for
limits on officials' discretionary power and, in sentencing, a shift away
from the highly individualized model to stronger versions of equality
and equal treatment. The call for change was interpreted by state legislatures, sentencing commissions, and a National Academy of Science
panel (Blumstein et al. 1983) as a call for justice systems explicitly to
abjure race- or class-linked factors such as employment status or familial situation as sentencing criteria.
From the initial premise that race- (and to a lesser degree, class-)
linked factors should not be allowed to affect decisions in prejudicial
ways, it was an easy slide to say that the focus of punishment ought to
be the act, not the actor. That was the move to just deserts, which
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promised a measure of equal treatment for those committing like offenses. That policy, along with other nondesert approaches (such as
mandatory minimums), were established during the 1970s and 1980s
within a general context of a rising tide of punitiveness.
This demand for strong versions of equality in justice systems resonated with how racial justice has been conceived historically in U.S.
liberal law: "equal justice under the law." Initially embodied in the
three Reconstruction Amendments in the late 1860s, the racial justice
demand was keyed to black men (for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, though not the Thirteenth). However, when women (or
gender difference) are discussed (then and today), the justice demand
shifts to a more weakened equality standard and a greater acceptance
of difference. 3 More specifically, in crime and justice, it has been easier
to discuss differences in the kinds and qualities of crimes that men and
women commit and in the kinds of justice system responses that may
be more appropriate for women than it is to discuss differences ordered by race or ethnicity. As but one example, reformatories and prisons were expressly built for men and for women, but not for whites
and blacks.
What happened then when sentencing reformers considered women
in sentencing policy? As enumerated by Blumstein et al. (1983, p. 114),
if the aim was to "equalize sentences," there were these options: to
punish women more like men, to punish men more like women, or to
shift both groups to achieve an average of past sentencing practices
(split-the-difference). Of these, only one-to punish men more like
women-optimally combines principles of parsimony and proportionality. That option was not acceptable at the time: it would have made
the sentencing system appear "too lenient." Instead, sentencing reformers decided that if strong versions of equality were to be applied
to men, then they should also be applied to women. In practical terms,
this meant that black men should be punished no more than white men
for "like crimes" and that all women would face harsher penalties (like
men's or split the difference) than before.
3 These different justice demands are evident in the U.S. Supreme Court's use of
different standards in deciding whether sex- or race-based classifications in work, education, housing, voting, etc., are constitutional, although these have not been applied to
criminal justice policy except in challenges to the death penalty. Sex-based classifications
have been permitted a more relaxed standard (intermediate scrutiny) than have racebased classifications (strict scrutiny). We agree with Rhode's (1987, p. 21) observation
that less attention should be given to "women's and minorities' respective places in an
oppression sweepstakes" and more to "the continuities and discontinuities in various
patterns of discrimination."

Gender, Race, and Sentencing

An ironic result of sentencing reform is that in the name of a restricted notion of equality with men, more women (especially black
women) are being incarcerated than ever before. And in the name of
racial justice in the criminal process, more black men are being incarcerated than ever before. Sentencing reformers vastly underestimated
the electorate's susceptibility to law-and-order appeals and the harsher
penalties imposed on (and served by) offenders.
C. A Policy Dilemma
Were we advocates on behalf of disadvantaged groups of accused
men, especially those who are members of racial and ethnic minority
groups, we might endorse a strong version of equality in sentencing,
perhaps with some allowance for their "good works" as fathers or community members (see Tonry 1995). But were we policy advocates on
behalf of all accused women, we would not endorse strong equality
for several reasons. First, any equality model is bound to be malecentered, taking men's circumstances, motives, and actions as the norm
for crime and punishment. Second, women generally have more to
gain from an individualized model, which focuses on future-oriented
criteria such as having responsibilities for others and reform potential.
Imagine now that we are advocates for both groups. We find ourselves looking in two directions at the same time: toward seeing justice
as equality (or "equal treatment"), on the one hand, and seeing justice
as a response to individual (though often gender-linked) differences,
on the other. Sentencing reformers faced this dilemma, and they decided to apply the distinctive demands of racial justice and racial redress to those for gender. That stance, coupled with the War on Drugs
and the law-and-order campaigns of the 1980s, has yielded dramatically increasing incarceration rates.
V. Recommendations for Policy and Future Research
How should policy makers respond? How might they think differently
about sentencing? We offer these recommendations for policy and future research.
First, policy makers need to rethink the aims and purposes of punishment. One way to do that is to contemplate women as sentencing
subjects. As an initial step, we might imagine a form of gender neutrality that is female-normed, and we might fashion an equal treatment
punishment scheme in which women, not men, are the standard. For
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example, if statistical averages of previous sentencing outcomes are
used to guide future sentencing policy, policy makers should consider
using women's, not men's, outcomes as the base. Research is needed
that examines the varied circumstances and contexts of women's lawbreaking and the points at which they are both similar and different
from men's lawbreaking. Variation in women's responses to sanctions
or the threat of sanctions also need to be studied. We know that, on
average, women are less likely to be repeat offenders and to return to
prison. This should matter in devising sanctions and in fashioning sentencing policy. By disrupting the image of men as presumptive sentencing subjects, we may see some men's lawbreaking in a different,
perhaps more sympathetic light, and we can revisit questions of what
is just and humane punishment.
Second, policy makers must consider ways of shifting public opinion
away from extraordinarily harsh punishment schemes. For two decades
in the United States, there has been unremitting pressure for increases
in penalties and no pressure for decreases. Liberals and radicals who
were involved in the early sentencing reform movement envisaged not
only a more equitable sentencing policy but one that reduced the use
of incarceration as a crime control measure. However, the punitive tide
has continually risen since the mid-1970s. As a result, while there has
been increasing fiscal and political support for expanding the criminal
justice system, there has been less for education, housing, and social
welfare. Research in other countries suggests that the U.S. criminal
justice system is more punitive than elsewhere. Comparative research
needs to be brought into the policy debates in the United States; in
that way, decreases in levels of punishment will not be seen as concessions to soft-hearted liberals but, rather, as a more rational allocation
of resources. Research on alternatives to the criminal justice system,
including alternatives to incarceration, must document promising approaches with a strong visual and economic message to policy makers
and citizens.
Third, policy makers must address the foreseeable distributive effects of policies. If these have a disparate effect on particular groups,
the policies need to be rethought. One way to inspire such rethinking
is the tool of rebuttable presumption. That is, unless disparate-effectcausing policies can be shown to achieve important public policy goals,
the policies should be reconsidered. The most dramatic example of not
considering the disparate-effect-causing effects of a particular criminal
justice policy was the War on Drugs. Because visible drug dealing is
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found in inner city areas, it was foreseeable that tactical policies aimed
at substantial arrests and incarceration of drug dealers would yield a
sharp increase in the numbers of minority group prisoners. This might
have been justifiable it there had been reason to expect that drug use
or trafficking would diminish as a result, but there was little reason to
believe those things would happen (Wilson 1990; Tonry 1995,
chap. 3). There is an important role for research that can forecast the
future distributive effects of policies, under varied conditions.
Fourth, researchers need to fashion better methods of assessing justice system practices. That will entail an understanding of how justice
"gets done," including practitioners' understandings of the "right response" and ways to evaluate those activities that are empathetic and
critical. The just deserts movement sought to reduce disparity in sentencing those convicted of "like crimes" and with similar criminal histories. In seeking to eradicate sources of decision makers' prejudice,
such policies unwittingly removed the positive uses of their discretion.
Legislating justice from a distance and not consulting closely with
practitioners themselves were mistakes. Likewise, assessing justice
from a distance and not paying close attention to how justice "gets
done" are mistakes. Statistical evidence alone is not sufficient in evaluating sentencing practices, nor is recourse to celebrated cases of unjust
decisions. A more complete measure of justice would contain a moral
dimension, and it would permit oscillation between logicoscientific and
narrative modes of reasoning (Daly 1994a, chaps. 1 and 12).
Finally, policy makers need to wrestle with the fact that practices
that are race- and gender-neutral, as well as those that are overtly prejudiced, can produce injustice. Further, there is a need to consider the
distinctive demands of justice that multiple inequalities-of class, raceethnicity, gender, and age-produce. A justice system that is based on
an imperative of uniformity (or equal treatment) will produce injustice,
as will one based on an imperative of individuality (or individualized
treatment). Striking a balance between the two appears the only route,
but in taking this tack, state authorities will be assailed for both lacking
a standard and imposing just one standard. We should expect that the
practices of doing justice will produce destabilization and incoherence.
Better to acknowledge the limits of doing justice in an unequal society,
even as one imagines a different world. In the interim, the principles
that may best guide policy makers are responses that cause least harm
and a parsimonious use of penal law and the machinery of criminal justice.
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